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When the government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) issued a policy state-ment in April 20081 indicat-
ing that the country was seriously consid-
ering developing a civilian nuclear-power 
program, it set the region and the world 
speculating as to the possible motivations 
behind such a move at that time. Since 
that date, the UAE has aggressively forged 
ahead, signing bilateral agreements with 
nuclear-supplier countries while increasing 
cooperation with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) in support of its 
bid to add nuclear power to its national 
energy portfolio. Most recently, the UAE 
has actually broken ground on its first and 
second reactors, in 2012 and 2013. At a 
time when the nuclear industry’s “renais-
sance” has slowed or even faltered2 as a 
result of the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi ac-
cident, the global dynamics of the industry 
seemed to have little effect on the bold and 
confident pace of the UAE’s nuclear plans. 
Worldwide, the future looks dimmer for 
nuclear than it did a few short years ago: 
Germany has pursued a policy of early 
decommissioning of its nuclear-power 
capacity;3 the Netherlands has adopted a 
“wait and see” attitude with respect to new 
nuclear plants;4 and new plants already 
under construction in China, France and 
Finland have experienced delays and cost 
overruns.5 Even in the face of these signs 
of a slowdown in the industry, however, 
the UAE continues to press ahead in its 
pursuit of nuclear power. Yet why should 
an oil-rich country like the UAE pursue a 
civilian nuclear power program, especially 
at a time when the future of nuclear-power 
around the world is uncertain? 
THE UAE AND NUCLEAR ENERGY
 A member of the IAEA since 1976, the 
UAE first entered the nuclear nonprolif-
eration regime in 1995 with its signature 
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT).6 A safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA was signed in 2002 and entered into 
force in 2003.7 Three years later, in 2006, 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) com-
missioned a feasibility study on nuclear-
energy development in the region.8 The 
UAE began its own domestic inquiries, 
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Hitachi; and a consortium led by the Korea 
Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO).15 
Desiring to purchase a single reactor type, 
the UAE selected KEPCO’s APR-1400 
(based on Westinghouse’s System 80+ 
design) over AREVA’s EPR and GE-
Hitachi’s ABWR; it signed a deal for four 
reactors at a total $20.4 billion.16 Financing 
was provided largely by the largest Emir-
ate, Abu Dhabi. The UAE-KEPCO deal 
follows previous agreements signed by the 
UAE for the construction of conventional 
power plants and desalination facilities — 
the deal specifies a 60/40 ownership split 
and contractor-based approach, as opposed 
to developing an autonomous indigenous 
nuclear industry.17 
 Construction on the first reactor, Bara-
kah I, began in July 2012, and on Barakah 
II in 2013. According to the World Nuclear 
Association, Barakah I is scheduled to start 
up in 2017, with one additional reactor 
scheduled to come on line every year until 
2020 for a total of four APR-1400 units. 
With the common GCC electricity grid 
and energy market in place since 2011,18 
the UAE looks to profit by selling excess 
capacity to its neighbors. 
 The worldwide nuclear industry relies 
heavily on experience and best practices 
learned over decades of operation and 
regulation.19 Given the high stakes in-
volved, the safe and secure operation of a 
nuclear power plant must take precedence 
over efficiency and profitability in opera-
tion. The unique safety concerns associated 
with nuclear energy require a sophisticated 
institutional approach to ensure compliance 
with the highest operations standards. Even 
though there would arguably be environ-
mental risks and safety concerns associated 
with a nuclear power plant, the decision 
to continue with such an investment stems 
from multidimensional calculations to 
and an important step was taken in 2009 
with the successful negotiation of a “123 
Agreement” with the United States.9 This 
technology-transfer agreement opened the 
door to UAE collaboration with U.S. com-
panies and sent a signal to other countries 
that the UAE was serious about prolifera-
tion concerns. The UAE followed this with 
the signing of an Additional Protocol with 
the IAEA in 2009, which entered into force 
the next year.10 
 As recommended by the IAEA, the 
UAE established the Federal Authority for 
Nuclear Regulation (FANR) in September 
2009 as the governmental body responsible 
for the regulation and licensing of nuclear 
energy in the country.11 A few months later, 
in December 2009, the Emirates Nuclear 
Energy Corporation (ENEC) was estab-
lished as the national nuclear operator by 
decree of the UAE president, Sheikh Khal-
ifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan.12 The ENEC was 
tasked with opening a bidding process for 
the construction of nuclear power plants 
in the country, assisted by a nine-member 
international advisory board chaired by 
former IAEA director Hans Blix.13 
 The appointment of Blix was a 
confidence-building measure in pursuit 
of transparency and public relations to as-
sure the international community that the 
program is indeed for peaceful purposes 
only.  Through incorporating the advice of 
experts and formally renouncing its right 
to reprocessing and enrichment, the UAE 
government has been praised for setting 
the “Gold Standard” for nonproliferation 
agreements.14 
 After announcing their interest in bid-
ding for the UAE nuclear-power contract, 
nine companies and consortiums were 
pared down to a short list of three serious 
bids in 2009: a French consortium con-
sisting of AREVA, Suez and Total; GE-
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hane and Joseph Nye identify three main 
characteristics of interdependency. First, 
interdependency is characterized by societ-
ies relating to each other through “multiple 
channels” with an emphasis on informal 
and nongovernmental bonds. Second, 
interdependent states’ relations with each 
other are increasingly characterized by 
an “absence of hierarchy among issues,” 
where interstate relations are not restricted 
simply to high politics, but include busi-
nesses, multinational corporations, NGOs, 
etc. Finally, as states become more inter-
dependent, Kohane and Nye argue that this 
relegates military force to a minor role as 
states grow to trust each other in specific 
issue areas. In its place, states prefer to use 
something Nye terms “soft power”: seek-
ing non-military means of rhetorically or 
strategically coopting other states.20 
 Given the importance of soft power 
in a world where countries have complex 
and interdependent relationships with one 
another, policy makers are often concerned 
for their sources and degrees of sensitivi-
ties and vulnerabilities in foreign economic 
relations.21 For instance, although it is a 
small country, the UAE today contributes 
1.7 percent to world natural-gas produc-
tion, while at the same time consuming 
a massive 2 percent of the world’s total 
natural-gas usage.22 In order to satisfy its 
growing thirst for natural gas, the UAE has 
been forced to become a net importer of 
gas, even as it sits on some of the world’s 
largest reserves. Understandably, Emirati 
policy makers perceive this as a strategic 
vulnerability and have been working to 
ameliorate this dependency on its neigh-
bors for energy supply. 
 Why would the UAE, an important 
oil and natural-gas supplier, want to 
develop nuclear energy? We argue that 
Emirati nuclear ambitions can be under-
counterbalance geopolitical, economic and 
other regional security dynamics. 
 Like most of the countries in its re-
gion, the UAE is rich in fossil fuels, which 
have produced both immense prosperity 
for its citizens and a lax attitude towards 
energy efficiency. In the UAE, this has 
been compounded by strong economic 
growth and a sudden population growth 
spurt, resulting in a massive increase in 
the demand for electricity. Cultivating a 
domestic source of electricity generation 
would not only help alleviate the increase 
in local consumption; the surplus could 
also be sold to neighboring countries. Both 
strengthening domestic supply sources and 
selling excess to neighbors reflect the com-
plex interdependent relationship the GCC 
countries have with one another. Also, 
the same paradigm shows how the power 
plant in the UAE may be understood as a 
form of “soft power,” proclaiming itself as 
an example of how to conduct a transpar-
ent civilian nuclear program with proper 
political oversight (particularly to Iran).  
COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCY
 Foreign economic relations and trade 
are cornerstones of complex interdepen-
dency. In a globalized world, regional 
organizations such as the GCC create 
multilevel regional cooperation that tends 
to lead members to develop deeper ties 
with one another through both formal and 
informal channels. Trade proves to be a 
powerful force for increasing cooperation 
as boundaries to conducting international 
business are gradually eliminated through 
the building of trust. This increasing inter-
dependency among nations is viewed as a 
potential alternative to pursuing strategic 
competition over natural resources. 
 In seeking to describe this phenome-
non in international relations, Robert Keo-
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availability of stable markets where they 
could sell such resources. 
 The case of the UAE is particularly 
worth examining in that respect. It is an 
OPEC member state, but has in recent years 
started to face some of the challenges com-
mon to importing countries as it became a 
net importer of natural gas, due to its rapid 








rity, the UAE 
needs to adopt 
a multidimen-
sional approach since it would need to be 
concerned mostly with security of transport 
through the Strait of Hormuz, and also with 
supply security of natural-gas imports. 
 Mitigation of geopolitical risks associ-
ated with the Strait of Hormuz would be 
the top priority of the UAE. The crude-oil 
pipeline project to Fujairah is strategically 
important in circumventing the chokepoint. 
Politically, the risk of increasing dependen-
cy on imported (mostly Qatari and Saudi) 
natural gas is also a growing risk factor that 
the UAE needs to deal with. The nuclear 
plant currently being built at Barakah plays 
an important role in providing diversifica-
tion and an alternative source for electric-
ity. With regard to the Iranian nuclear pro-
gram, the UAE’s program may be seen as 
a form of soft power by setting an example 
to the region for the process of obtaining 
civilian nuclear energy. It is important to 
highlight that renouncing uranium enrich-
ment is a unilateral act enshrined in the 123 
Agreement with the United States and not 
an international legal obligation based on 
stood through both economic and political 
lenses. Economically, the UAE’s rapidly 
growing electricity consumption needs 
new sources of electricity supply. Politi-
cally, it is to send a message to regional 
actors who also aspire to develop a nuclear 
program without transparency. In order to 
avoid the threat of blockage to the strategic 











should not merely be seen as a “resource 
war,”23 but a concept in and of itself for a 
policy aimed at mitigating risks to security 
and economic infrastructure. The case of 
foreign assistance for building domestic 
electricity supply through nuclear power 
plants is an example of such complexity. 
 According to the IEA, energy security 
refers to the uninterrupted availability of 
energy sources at an affordable price.24 
The IEA further emphasizes to its member 
countries the need to improve energy secu-
rity by promoting diversity, efficiency and 
flexibility within the energy sectors. How-
ever, the IEA focuses mostly on supply se-
curity, while the concept of energy security 
might change depending on the country. 
C. K. Ebinger suggests that the meaning 
of energy security will most likely vary, 
depending on the viewpoint of the observ-
er.25 One can infer that while a country like 
China would be concerned about security 
of resources and their supplies, energy 
producers such as the OPEC countries and 
Russia would be more concerned about the 
Mitigation of geopolitical risks associated 
with the Strait of Hormuz would be the 
top priority of the UAE. The crude-
oil pipeline project to Fujairah is 
strategically important in circumventing 
the chokepoint.
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ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS
 Pressure to make new investments for 
electricity generation in the UAE comes 
from the rapid increase in the country’s 
electricity consumption. This rise was trig-
gered by a growing economy that attracted 
a larger population (mostly non-Emiratis) 
to settle in the UAE, which in turn had 
led to a doubling of the population since 
2005. This demand increase also includes 
a greater need for desalination, an energy-
intensive process concerning the needs for 
water, transportation and other infrastruc-
ture. The significant increase in both popu-
lation and population density is illustrated 
in Table 1.
the codes and rules of the IAEA. However, 
a sovereign country forgoing such a right 
sets an example for practicality and is not 
necessarily prescriptive as the ideal model, 
since the IAEA emphasis is on the transpar-
ency and accountability of the enrichment 
process. Finally, reducing the export of its 
fossil resource for electricity generation 
would be important for regional balances, 
not only vis à vis policy towards Iran, but 
also in terms of the UAE’s bargaining 
power within GCC politics. Ultimately, in 
the case of the UAE’s energy security, Emi-
rati policy can be understood as the product 
of a multidimensional strategy to reduce 
external dependencies and address internal 
vulnerabilities. 
TABLE 1. Population Increase in the UAE, 2005-1026
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Population  
(millions) 4.11 5.01 6.22 8.07 8.20 8.26
Population Density 
(people/km2) 58 71 88 114 115 116
  
FIGURE 1. Increase in Net Electricity Consumption in the UAE27
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 One can see that both the actual popu-
lation (from 4.1 million to 8.2 million) and 
the population density (from 58 to 116) in 
the UAE have doubled in a mere five years, 
2005-10. This created a huge increase in 
the demand for electricity (see Figure 1). 
 By contrast, the investments aimed at 
increasing the output of electricity generat-
ed have remained constant during 2005-10. 
This is reflected in a heavy increase in the 
import of natural gas, a fact that is illus-
trated by Table 2.
 Additionally, annual electricity de-
mand from 2007 onwards was estimated 
to grow at an annual rate of 9 percent. The 
UAE has been heavily investing in renew-
able-energy technologies, most notably the 
Masdar Initiative near Abu-Dhabi, which 
almost exclusively focuses on renew-
able energy forms, including solar, and 
hosts the headquarters of the International 
Renewable Energy Agency.29 Still, it is 
estimated that only 6-7 percent of the na-
tional demand could be met by renewables 









Total 0.04 0.23 0.66 1.04 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.36 1.42 11.23% 6.52%
Solids 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00% 0.00%
Liquids 0.01 0.12 0.24 0.28 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.46 11.48% 8.42%
Gases 0.03 0.08 0.37 0.62 0.60 0.56 0.04 0.73 0.72 10.44% 5.67%
Primary 
Electricity 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.25 16.78% 9.40%
Energy  
Production
Total 2.21 3.78 4.61 6.38 7.06 7.12 7.60 7.57 7.56 3.66% 1.70%
Solids 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00% 0.00%
Liquids 2.18 3.51 3.91 4.98 5.25 5.30 5.70 5.61 5.80 2.85% 2.48%
Gases 0.03 0.27 0.70 1.40 1.81 1.82 1.90 1.96 1.76 13.25% -0.61%
Primary 
Electricity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00% 0.00%
Net Energy 
Imports
Total -2.17 -3.39 -3.40 -4.44 -4.50 -4.46 -4.79 -4.45 -4.31 -2.34% 1.10%
Solids 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00% 0.00%
Liquids -2.17 -3.30 -3.28 -4.19 -3.97 -3.93 -4.25 -4.07 -4.56 -2.15% 3.52%
Gases 0.00 -0.09 -0.12 -0.25 -0.53 -0.53 -0.54 -0.38 0.25 -7.50% 56.83%
        * All energy values are in Exajoules (1018 J)
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the growing electricity consumption rate 
in the UAE. In that regard, since much of 
the rise in electricity consumption is linked 
to the rise in population in urban areas, the 
issue of household electricity consumption 
rates and efficiency also become important 
matters to consider for future research. 
 Hence, there is on one hand the pres-
sure of population growth — not mostly 
from births but from migration, as a conse-
quence of the need for labor and services 
in a rapidly growing economy. In addition, 
there is also a growth in consumption per 
capita as cities expand. The use of electrici-
ty in more densely populated urban settings 
also causes the consumption of electricity 
to increase tremendously as citizens seek 
higher standards of living. Thus, this shift 
from net exporter to net importer of natural 
gas has accompanied the rapid growth in 
the economy of the UAE. This, of course, 
puts increased pressure on the government 
to develop new investments to address 
demand. In the long run, there would be a 
need to both increase energy efficiency and 
in even the most advantageous scenarios.30
 With such growing populations and 
economies, emerging countries such as the 
UAE face pressure to quickly find rem-
edies for the growing gap between energy 
supply and demand. And although the 
UAE is a member of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
it depends on the export of oil and natural 
gas in order to substantially fund the entire 
nation. Thus, the more subsidized oil and 
electricity generated from natural gas are 
consumed internally, the fewer resources 
would be available for exports, meaning 
fewer revenues from the primary income 
source. 
 To highlight the growing concerns 
since 2008, and directly because of electric-
ity generated by natural gas, the UAE has 
become a net gas importer (see Figure 2).
 The UAE’s electricity consumption in 
2010 was estimated at 85.2 billion kilowatt 
hours (kWh), 8.5 percent higher than in the 
previous year.32 Energy efficiency would 
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FIGURE 2. Abrupt Shift in UAE Net Natural Gas Exports31 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
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reduce the subsidies that currently discour-
age advances in efficiency. 
GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSIONS
 Though the UAE is rich in energy 
resources, it could not efficiently cope with 
the sudden population growth consuming 
so much electricity, mostly generated from 






percent of the 
world total. 
Its production 
in 2013 was 
around 56 bil-
lion cubic meters, corresponding to about 
1.7 percent of the world production that 
year.33 At the same time, the UAE is now 
a net importer of natural gas, choosing to 
fill its energy deficit with imports rather 
than ramp up domestic production. This 
suggests that policy makers have chosen to 
hold its strategic reserves for future use or 
export. By using nuclear energy to provide 
baseload power, the UAE can cope with 
its growing demand and reduce its depen-
dency on external sources of gas.
 Due to its location on the Persian Gulf, 
the UAE is highly dependent on the Strait 
of Hormuz for the export of energy re-
sources. The UAE risk-mitigation strategy 
to reduce dependency on this geostrategic 
chokepoint consists of two key compo-
nents. First, by completing a pipeline for 
crude oil to the port of Fujairah located 
on the Gulf of Oman, the UAE can export 
crude to the world via the Indian Ocean. 
This eliminates the risks associated with 
dependency on the Strait, such as tanker 
accidents or political conflicts that could 
slow or halt tanker traffic. The second is to 
develop more refineries and LNG termi-
nals in Fujairah, not just for export but also 
reduce transport time and insurance costs 
by mitigating risk. 
 Another important aspect of risk miti-
gation from the UAE standpoint concerns 
the complex interdependent relationship 
among the GCC countries. The narrow 
Strait of 
Hormuz is a 
risk factor. 
However, 
the UAE, by 
developing 
both a nuclear 
power plant 
and alterna-
tive routes via 
Fujairah, aims to reduce its “vulnerability.” 
The UAE depends significantly on the 
Strait, but it can mitigate a portion of the 
risk by developing alternatives for local 
electrical supply and hydrocarbon exports 
and re-exports. 
 In contrast, given the current political 
situation, Qatar would be more vulnerable 
to a slowdown or halt of tanker traffic at 
the Strait of Hormuz. Considering the cur-
rent sensitive relationship between Qatar 
and Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain, 
Qatar would be more motivated to culti-
vate close relations with Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE; the former is the only country 
with which it shares a border, and the lat-
ter is one of its largest LNG consumers. 
The UAE, by reducing (though not elimi-
nating) its dependency on Qatari natural 
gas for electricity generation, could use 
a portion of it to replace its own strategic 
gas resources or to re-export gas in times 
of crises. 
 This situation has perhaps been one 
of the important reasons for the UAE, 
Policy makers have chosen to hold its 
strategic reserves for future use or export. 
By using nuclear energy to provide 
baseload power, the UAE can cope 
with its growing demand and reduce its 
dependency on external sources of gas.
Dirioz and Reimold.indd   78 8/20/2014   11:48:33 AM
79
Dirioz / reimolD: The STraTegic conTexT of The Uae’S nUclear ProjecT
tion commitments and guarantees, the UAE 
government has been praised for setting 
the “Gold Standard” for nonproliferation 
agreements.36 The IAEA and the nonpro-
liferation community commonly evaluate 
civilian nuclear-power programs on the 
basis of three broad technical areas (the 
“3Ss”): safety, security and safeguards.37 
These three areas are closely linked; 
institutional progress to improve security 
— increasing physical protection measures, 
for instance — has positive implications 
for facility safety and accounting for all the 
nuclear material on site. Achieving success 
in safety, security and safeguards requires a 
rigorous and robust institutional structure, 
where ties between the operator and regu-
lating agency are limited and safety and 
security are not compromised in the effort 
to keep the nuclear plant operating. 
 The IAEA therefore works with states’ 
domestic institutions in order to strengthen 
organizational practices, legislation and 
regulatory oversight in these three techni-
cal areas. The UAE is no exception; it 
has been working closely with the IAEA 
to deepen its ties of cooperation since its 
decision to pursue a nuclear-power pro-
gram. A key step in the UAE’s relationship 
with the IAEA came in December 2011, 
when the country signed a Country Profile 
Framework (CPF) with the agency.38 The 
CPF forms the inter-institutional basis for 
technical cooperation between the UAE 
and the IAEA through setting a detailed 
roadmap for development needs and the 
agency’s support for national institutions. 
The CPF was followed by the signing of an 
Integrated Work Plan (IWP) in June 2013,39 
a major step towards deeper institutional 
cooperation. The IWP specifies cooperation 
on technical projects intended to support 
the UAE’s development of sound national 
institutions and nuclear infrastructure ac-
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain to take the harsh 
measure of withdrawing their ambassadors 
from Qatar back in March 2014 over dif-
ferences of opinion regarding the develop-
ments in Egypt.34 Furthermore, Qatar’s 
decision to not implement reciprocity and 
hence not to withdraw its own ambassador 
has been interpreted as a gesture of ap-
peasement, and subsequent declarations 
from meetings of the GCC show signs of 
a renormalization of relations among these 
states. The ambassador-withdrawal episode 
demonstrated the importance of relations 
between GCC countries and their relative 
dependency on the Strait of Hormuz with 
respect to each other. With other options 
besides the strait to export their oil and 
natural gas, Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
would remain sensitive but less vulnerable 
than Qatar to the problems of the Strait of 
Hormuz. The withdrawal of ambassadors 
could also be understood as a form of soft 
power35 exercised by Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE to coerce Qatar to show more soli-
darity with the other Arab dynasties. 
 Finally, as a political and security 
issue, the existence of a nuclear power 
plant, even if it is for civilian use, would 
send a political message to the other Arab 
and non-Arab countries of the Middle East 
in terms of best practices in the areas of 
transparency and security. The UAE at-
taches great importance to this issue as a 
matter of national prestige, to solidify its 
national image as a regional commercial 
hub and center of stability. 
SECURITY AND SAFEGUARDS
 In its pursuit of a civilian nuclear-pow-
er program, the UAE has been praised for 
its efforts aimed at assuring the internation-
al community that the program is solely for 
peaceful purposes. By taking the initiative 
to enter into many voluntary nonprolifera-
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cording to international best practices.40 
 Complying with the IAEA, the UAE 
established the Federal Authority for 
Nuclear Regulation (FANR) and the Emir-
ates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), 
which serves as the national nuclear 
operator. ENEC was tasked with opening a 
bidding process for the construction of nu-
clear power plants in the country, assisted 
by a nine-member international advisory 
board chaired by former IAEA director 
Hans Blix.41 The international advisory 
board (IAB), by publishing semi-annual 
reports, provides more information to the 
international community about transpar-
ency, nonproliferation, safety and security 
of the civilian nuclear projects. Further-
more, other institutions were established 
both for transparency and capacity build-
ing. For instance, the Gulf Nuclear En-
ergy Infrastructure Institute (GNEII) was 
established in 2011 as a Khalifa University 
institution. There is also a UAE Nuclear 
Energy Scholarships Program initiative, as 
a demonstration of the government of Abu 
Dhabi’s commitment to developing human 
capital for the long-term viability of the 
nuclear power plants. 
 These confidence-building public 
campaigns for greater transparency and 
nonproliferation activities are precisely 
tailored for the international community in 
an attempt to improve the UAE’s image. 
The UAE has not always had a positive re-
lationship with the nonproliferation regime 
— the notorious proliferation network 
established by Pakistani nuclear scientist 
A.Q. Khan used Dubai as an important 
transit hub in the effort to acquire dual-use 
technologies. Through local front compa-
nies established by taking advantage of 
the UAE’s lax regulation, the A.Q. Khan 
network was able to use Dubai to hide the 
sources and destinations of the supplies 
it was seeking to acquire. Because of the 
complicated UAE federal system, each of 
the Emirates had a different set of customs 
laws, and interagency cooperation among 
the Emirates was virtually nil. The A.Q. 
Khan network exploited this lack of effec-
tive export controls in its efforts to acquire 
key fuel-cycle technologies. 
 When the A.Q. Khan network was 
exposed in early 2004, the role of the 
UAE — and Dubai as a strategic tran-
sit point — fell under the microscope 
of policy makers in the West.42 Pressure 
began to build for the UAE to improve 
its export laws, and in September 2007 
the first federal export and trade-control 
law was passed. This law provided for 
coordination among all the Emirates in 
the area of export and control of dual-use 
technologies at the federal level, covering 
all import, export and transit of dual-use 
items in Emirati territory, including its 
Free Trade Zones.43 Still, it took almost 
two years for the commission tasked with 
overseeing the new law to meet for the 
first time,44 suggesting that enforcement of 
the law may be lagging behind its strength 
on paper. The speed with which the UAE 
pursued its nuclear program has left some 
observers apprehensive that its institutions 
may not be able to keep up with the pace 
of construction.
MANAGING CHALLENGES
 How did the UAE successfully over-
come these challenges to its nuclear ambi-
tions, and how do the tactics it used shed 
light on its strategic position? The UAE 
was able to allay the concerns of potential 
suppliers through careful negotiation and 
extending unilateral guarantees. Spe-
cifically, in bilateral negotiations, Emirati 
policy makers successfully pitted potential 
suppliers against each other. France was 
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the resulting policy direction taken by the 
UAE. This negotiation also contributed to 
a competitive bidding process. By generat-
ing excitement in the right channels about 
the seriousness of their intentions, Emirati 
negotiators first secured the necessary 
legal frameworks to ensure that multiple 
countries and consortiums would be able 
to offer competitive bids. By playing off 
potential suppliers against each other, both 
for acquiring technology-transfer agree-
ments and for the actual bidding process, 
UAE policy makers ensured they were 
able to make a secure and economical 
choice for a nuclear vendor. 
CONCLUSION
 In this paper we have placed the 
UAE’s nuclear-power program in its stra-
tegic context, specifically with respect to 
the economic and geopolitical factors the 
country faces. Acquiring nuclear energy 
helps address these identified vulnerabili-
ties and sensitivities. In addition, Emirati 
policy makers have sought to portray their 
country as an example for the region of 
how to acquire foreign nuclear assistance 
in a correct and transparent manner. What 
makes sense for the UAE, given its unique 
situation, however, may not prove to be 
easily replicable by other aspiring coun-
tries, whose economic and geopolitical 
situations may dictate further political and 
financial concessions in order to acquire 
nuclear plants of their own. Overall, the 
nuclear-power program of the UAE is an 
excellent example of sound economic and 
political decision making, but the jury 
remains out concerning Emirati claims of 
their program’s representing a model for 
the region.
the first country to be approached about the 
possibility of a technology-transfer agree-
ment, at the same time that France was 
attempting to negotiate a naval base for 
French forces in Emirati territory. France 
was approached first because of its dem-
onstrated willingness to sign nuclear-as-
sistance deals with a wide range of states. 
Second, an agreement with France would 
become leverage in negotiations with the 
United States. With the French deal in 
hand and the naval-base negotiations ongo-
ing, the UAE turned to Washington for 
a 123 Agreement for nuclear-technology 
transfer. The United States was worried 
about the implications that failure to sign a 
123 Agreement would have on its strategic 
partnership with the UAE. Washington’s 
concerns were alleviated through the 
UAE’s willingness to formalize its unilat-
eral public declarations not to seek the full 
nuclear-fuel cycle. A key condition of the 
U.S.-UAE 123 Agreement formalizes the 
UAE’s pledge not to acquire enrichment 
or reprocessing capabilities, prompting 
some to label the UAE’s approach the 
Gold Standard of how to pursue a peaceful 
nuclear-power program.45 
 After achieving legitimacy and le-
verage from the successfully negotiated 
assistance agreement with France, Emirati 
policy makers consulted with a wide range 
of experts from many members of the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the key 
international body tasked with controlling 
the transfer of dual-use technologies. By 
inviting participation from many differ-
ent sources within the NSG during the 
formative stage of its nuclear program, 
the UAE ensured that those who were 
consulted would approve and advocate for 
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